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Introduction 
 
This article discusses recent judicial approaches to the concepts of ‘right to 
livelihood’ and ‘procedural fairness’ in Malaysian labour law introduced by Tan Tek 
Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan (Tan’s case)1 and affirmed in Hong 
Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan (Hong Leong)
2
 and Rama Chandran, 
R v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor (Rama Chandran)
3
 I will analyse 
selected cases of the higher courts
4
 to understand the development, or lack of 
development of the emerging constitutionalised labour jurisprudence.   
 
The case of Said Dharmalingam bin Abdullah (formerly known as Dharmalingam 
a/l Ranganathan) v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd (Said)
5
  
 
In Said, the Federal Court had to consider the scope and significance of a statutory 
right to a pre-dismissal inquiry provided by section 14(1) of the Employment Act 
1955. In delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ held 
that the statutory right to due inquiry included the right to enter a plea in mitigation in 
relation to the issue of penalty. His Honour went on to hold that a failure of process, 
in not being allowed to enter a plea in mitigation, would only vitiate the outcome if 
there was discretion in the issue of punishment. If however, dismissal was the 
mandatory or obvious punishment, then the right to enter a plea in mitigation would 
be a useless formality. The court concluded that on the facts before it, since the 
misconduct of theft was very grave, dismissal was the only possible punishment. 
Consequently, the failure to enter a plea in mitigation did not amount to a failure of 
the statutory requirement of due inquiry.
6
  
 
Although the Federal Court in Said relied on common law public law precedents in 
analysing the consequences of a failure of natural justice,
7
 the court did not couch its 
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5
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6
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reasoning within the constitutional doctrines of the right to livelihood and procedural 
fairness propounded in Tan’s case, Hong Leong and Rama Chandran. An application 
of the doctrine of procedural fairness, within the context of an individual employee 
having the constitutional right to procedural fairness if his right to livelihood was 
affected, may have produced a different result, as it cannot be said with certainty that 
dismissal was the only result in the facts relating to Said. 
 
The case of Michael Lee Fook Wah v Minister of Human Resources Malaysia & 
Anor (Michael Lee)
8
 
 
The Court of Appeal in Michael Lee had to consider the nature of the Minister’s 
discretion under section 20(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, which provides 
that the Minister may refer a representation of unfair dismissal to the Industrial Court 
for arbitration.  
 
In considering the scope of Ministerial discretion, Shaik Daud JCA held: 
The court should not readily question the administrative decision of the first 
respondent as that is his absolute discretion. If the first respondent had acted 
ultra vires, unfairly or unjustly in exercising his discretion, then it is the duty 
of the courts to interfere in an application for review of that decision. 
 
… it can be seen that s 20(3) of the Act confers a discretion on the first 
respondent as to whether or not to refer any particular representation. Whether 
a reference is made must, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of 
each particular case. The court will only interfere when there is evidence to 
show that the discretion was exercised unlawfully. 
 
… The exercise of this discretion is vested in the Minister, not in the courts. 
When this discretion is challenged, the courts must be vigilant and resist any 
temptation to convert the jurisdiction of the court to review, into a 
reconsideration on the merits as if it is an appeal.  
 
… An exercise of discretion does not always mean that it should be exercised 
only in a positive manner. A negative act, as in the present case, is equally an 
exercise of a discretion, provided the Minister had considered every aspect of 
the case.
9
 
 
The traditional view of judicial review above ignores the growth, by leaps and 
bounds, of modern administrative law not only under English common law but in 
Malaysian administrative jurisprudence as well.
10
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Although the issue in Michael Lee was similar to the issue in Hong Leong
11
 the Court 
of Appeal in Michael Lee did not utilise the doctrine of procedural fairness in their 
reasoning. Had they done so, the court may have held that the Minister was bound, 
under articles 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution,
12
 to give reasons for failing to 
refer the representation to the Industrial Court. A further aspect of judicial review 
would have been an examination of the reasons furnished, with a view of considering 
whether the Minister had taken into consideration irrelevant factors or failed to take 
into consideration relevant factors.
13
 Such an approach would have been in tandem 
with modern administrative law principles. The court in Michael Lee however, merely 
accepted the Minister’s averment in his affidavit that he had conducted a thorough 
study of the facts pertaining to the representation of unfair dismissal. 
 
The case of Ganesan G Suppiah v Mount Pleasure Corp Sdn Bhd (Ganesan)
14
  
 
Ganesan concerned the question whether a breach of natural justice in the pre-
dismissal stage could be cured at the subsequent Industrial Court hearing for unfair 
dismissal. The employee was an employee within section 2 of the Employment Act 
1955 and was therefore entitled to the statutory requirement of a pre-dismissal hearing 
under section 14(1) of the Employment Act 1955. The High Court applied the curing 
principle in the Supreme
15
 and Federal Court cases of Dreamland Corp (M) Sdn Bhd v 
Choong Chin Sooi & Anor (Dreamland)
16
 and Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong 
Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal (Wong)
17
 and held that the failure in 
holding a statutory or contractual pre-dismissal hearing was cured through the de novo 
hearing of the Industrial Court. 
 
In doing so, the High Court held that although Dreamland and Wong concerned 
employees who were not entitled to the statutory safeguard of a pre-dismissal inquiry 
in section 14(1) of the Employment Act 1955 as their earnings took them out of the 
coverage of the legislation, the principle propounded in those cases that an initial 
breach of natural justice could be cured at a subsequent de novo Industrial Court 
hearing applied to all employees instituting unfair dismissal proceedings in the 
Industrial Court. This was because the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under 
section 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 was only to decide whether the 
dismissal was for just cause and excuse, which was a consideration relating to the 
merits of the impugned dismissal. The Industrial Court therefore did not have the 
jurisdiction to consider issues of fair procedure and had therefore properly exercised 
its jurisdiction in considering the merits of the case before it.
18
      
 
The cases of Dreamland and Wong were decided before the constitutional 
pronouncements in Tan’s case, Hong Leong and Rama Chandran. The High Court in 
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Ganesan did not apply the constitutional reasoning in Tan’s case, Hong Leong and 
Rama Chandran to consider the question of whether a constitutional right to 
procedural fairness within the context of the right to livelihood was compatible with 
the curing principle in natural justice.  
 
The case of Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam, Hospital Besar Pulau 
Pinang v Utra Badi a/l K Perumal (Lembaga Tatatertib)
19
 
 
In Lembaga Tatatertib, a public servant was dismissed from his position as hospital 
attendant without having been given the opportunity to mitigate upon the issue of 
punishment. The employee however, was given the opportunity to make written 
representations regarding the alleged misconduct. The question before the Court of 
Appeal was whether the employee should also have been given the opportunity to 
make representations upon the issue of punishment. The Court of Appeal 
unanimously held that the principle of procedural fairness includes the right to make 
representations upon the issue of punishment. In the words of Gopal Sri Ram JCA: 
 
Procedural fairness demands not only the right in a public servant to make 
representations on the truth of the charges framed against him. It includes the 
right, after a finding of guilt is made against him, to make representations on 
the question of punishment.
20
 
 
Central to the question was whether the disciplinary process was viewed as one 
exercise involving a consideration of both guilt and punishment, in which case a 
single opportunity to make representations would fulfil the hearing requirement or 
whether it consisted of two separate stages and two separate hearing requirements. A 
precedent on point which the court was urged to follow was the Supreme Court’s21 
decision of Inspector General of Police v Alan Noor bin Kamat (Alan Noor).
22
 In 
Lembaga Tatatertib, the Court of Appeal treated the Supreme Court’s view in Alan 
Noor that the disciplinary process was one composite exercise, as mere obiter dicta 
since the point did not form the actual basis of the decision.
23
 Further, Gopal Sri Ram 
JCA opined that the Alan Noor decision was ‘plainly wrong’ as it was reached 
‘without the benefit of a mature argument upon the combined effect of arts 5(1) and 
8(1) of the Federal Constitution.’24  
 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA held that the disciplinary process involved a two-stage process 
and that since there was a possibility of a range of punishments
25
 being imposed, once 
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guilt had been established, the employee should be given the opportunity to mitigate 
upon the issue of punishment.
26
 
 
Siti Norma Yaakob JCA held that the principles of procedural fairness required that 
the employee should be allowed to make representations pertaining to punishment as 
such a procedure would be in harmony with article 135(2) FC, which gives civil 
servants a right to a reasonable opportunity of being heard prior to a dismissal or 
reduction in rank. Her Honour interpreted the requirement of being given a 
‘reasonable opportunity of being heard’ in article 135(2) FC as conferring the right to 
be heard throughout the proceedings, on both, issues of guilt and punishment, 
especially since there was a range of nine different possible punishments.
27
   
 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA also clarified the constitutional basis of the right to procedural 
and substantive fairness in labour law when he said, ‘The combined effect of arts 5(1) 
and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution is, in my judgment, to demand fairness both in 
procedure and substance whenever a public law decision has an adverse effect on any 
of the facets of a person’s life. Among these facets are a person’s livelihood and his 
reputation’.28 
 
An immediate observation from the quote above is that the court in Lembaga 
Tatatertib has embraced the protection of reputation as an extension of the right to life 
within article 5(1) FC.
29
 If this is the case, then the question, which arises, is whether 
the protection of reputation has now acquired an independent constitutional standing 
or whether his Honour was only referring to the protection of reputation as an integral 
and inter-related aspect of the protection of livelihood within the context of 
employment law. This is not entirely clear from the judgment. What is clear is that his 
Honour relied on decisions of the Supreme Court of India to justify his reasoning. He 
did so in two ways. 
 
Firstly, his Lordship relied on the case of Francis Coralie v Union of India
30
 to 
support a liberal, flexible and expansive approach towards the interpretation of 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights. Secondly, his Lordship sought to adopt 
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 6 
the approach of the Indian Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay 
v Dilipkumar,
31
where Desai and Misra JJ had said: 
 
And this view was taken as flowing from art 21 which mandates that no one shall be 
deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by 
law. The expression ‘life’ does not merely connote animal existence or a continued 
drudgery through life. The expression ‘life’ has a much wider meaning. Where 
therefore the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely to adversely affect 
reputation or livelihood of a person …the same can be put in jeopardy only by law 
which inheres fair procedure. (Emphasis added).  
 
From the dicta above of the Indian Supreme Court, a clear observation may be made 
that the court, in discussing the issue in the context of a departmental inquiry, treated 
the protection of reputation as integral to the protection of livelihood. However, while 
the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Lembaga Tatatertib does not make this link 
clear, an inference may be made that his Lordship was discussing the protection of 
reputation within the context of employment and thus the right to livelihood. This 
inference may be gleaned from the following reasoning of his: 
 
Now, it cannot be gainsaid that any sort of punishment imposed upon a public 
servant has serious consequences. It carries with it a stigma. It tarnishes 
reputation. The authorities are now well settled that the punishment of 
dismissal deprives a person of his livelihood and therefore of his ‘life’ within 
the meaning of that expression in art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. … 
Similarly, when a person is de[p]rived of his reputation, it would in my 
judgment, amount to a deprivation of ‘life’ within art 5(1) of the Federal 
Constitution. The right to reputation is part and parcel of human dignity. And 
it is the fundamental right of every person within the shores of Malaysia to 
live with common human dignity.
32
  
  
If Gopal Sri Ram JCA indeed meant to find a general right to reputation within the 
right to life, the consequence of finding such a general right to reputation may be that 
a new light is thereby cast on the express freedom of speech and expression 
guaranteed by article 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution.
33
 While article 10(2)(a) FC 
allows restrictions on the freedom of speech, there is no requirement within the 
express words of article 10(2)(a) FC that the restrictions ought to be reasonable. Thus, 
the new constitutional right to reputation may result in the laws which restrict free 
speech being subject to the fairness requirement within article 8(1) FC. It is however, 
not within the confines of this article to undertake a deeper analysis of yet another 
new constitutional phenomenon. Suffice to say that for the purposes of this article, 
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either construction of the right to reputation recognised in Lembaga Tatatertib would 
embrace the protection of reputation within an employment context. 
 
Apart from holding that the employee should have been given the right to make 
representations with respect to punishment, the court also held that the employee 
should have been given an oral hearing. While the Court of Appeal agreed with earlier 
judicial authority
34
 that ‘an oral hearing is not the sine qua non of procedural 
fairness’,35 it decided that the circumstances of the present case36 warranted an oral 
hearing as there were factual issues that needed to be clarified and that the failure on 
the part of the employer to conduct an oral hearing requested by the employee 
constituted a breach of procedural fairness.
37
 The court concluded that this new 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal in its earlier case of Raja Abdul Malek v 
Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors
38
 of requiring an oral hearing in 
deserving circumstances augured well with the approach taken by the courts in 
comparable common law jurisdictions, namely England,
39
 India
40
 and Australia.
41
 
 
In Lembaga Tatatertib, Gopal Sri Ram JCA reinforced the notion of the right to 
procedural fairness as a constitutional right. His Honour described the right as ‘one of 
the cornerstones of our public law jurisprudence’ and that ‘although the content of 
procedural fairness is well settled, its application varies according to the facts of each 
particular case’.42 
 
However, while the content of procedural fairness may be well settled in 
administrative law, the same cannot be said of the content of procedural fairness in 
labour law. A question may arise whether or not the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
is indeed within the settled scope of procedural fairness in Malaysian labour law. One 
argument before the court in Lembaga Tatatertib was that civil servants neither had a 
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right nor a legitimate expectation of a right to make representations on the issue of 
punishment. As the court disposed of the appeal by holding that civil servants did 
have a right to be heard on the issue of punishment, perhaps the court did not feel it 
necessary to consider the issue of legitimate expectation.  
 
It would however have been useful if the court had considered the relevance of 
legitimate expectation within the doctrine of procedural fairness and explained 
whether there might be legitimate expectations of the right to make representations on 
the issue of punishment in analogous situations.
 43
     
 
The case of Esso Production Malaysia Inc v Aladdin bin Mohd Hashim (Esso)
44
 
 
Esso concerned the continued postponement of an Industrial Court unfair dismissal 
trial.
45
 After three previous postponements,
46
 the Industrial Court had decided to 
proceed with the trial and refused a request for adjournment by the employee. The 
employee had requested an adjournment due to the reason that he only found out six 
days before the trial date that his solicitor had withdrawn from the case and was 
therefore left without legal representation.  
 
Consequently, the Industrial Court proceeded with the hearing, with the employee 
representing himself and upheld the employee’s dismissal in agreement with the 
employer’s finding that the allegation of bribery against the employee had been made 
out. The employee then initiated judicial review proceedings and sought to quash the 
Industrial Court’s award. The High Court granted the remedy of certiorari and the 
employer appealed against that order. 
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court by holding that the 
Industrial Court had not correctly exercised its discretion in relation to the request for 
adjournment. Gopal Sri Ram JCA, delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, 
agreed with the High Court’s decision that an adjournment should have been granted.  
 
The reasons given by his Honour were firstly, that the Industrial Court had failed to 
take into account a relevant consideration
47
 and secondly that as the misconduct in 
question involved a bribery charge which concerned an individual’s reputation, legal 
representation was all the more important. 
 
However, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the High Court was wrong in 
treating the case as within article 5(1) FC. In the words of Gopal Sri Ram JCA: 
 
The learned judge proceeded on the footing that the appellant had been 
deprived of his constitutional right to legal representation and that there had 
been a breach of art 5 of the Federal Constitution. We cannot accept that. This 
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The Minister had under section 20(3) Industrial Relations Act 1967 referred a complaint of unfair 
dismissal to the Industrial Court for arbitration proceedings.  
46
The claimant had requested the first postponement on 26
th
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47
 The fact that the employee had not requested two of the earlier postponements. 
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case does not turn on the provisions of the Federal Constitution. Neither does 
it have any relevance to the authority relied on by the learned judge … 48 
 
It is difficult to accept his Lordship’s disapproval of the approach taken by the High 
Court judge especially since his Lordship said: 
 
We remind ourselves that the charge is one of bribery. If proved, it demolishes 
the reputation of the person against whom it is made. In the circumstances, the 
issue is whether the respondent was given a fair opportunity to redeem his 
reputation. With respect, we do not think he was. The right to legal 
representation is a sine qua non in a case as the present. The Industrial Court 
ought to have allowed the respondent to be represented by legal counsel who 
is trained in the skill of cross-examination. We are therefore left in serious 
doubt whether the respondent was able to get his points across during cross-
examination. We are therefore unable to say with confidence that a fair 
procedure was given to the respondent on the facts peculiar to this case.
49
 
 
It must be remembered that in the earlier case of Lembaga Tatatertib discussed above, 
this very same judge and court held that the ‘right to life’ in article 5(1) FC 
encompassed the protection of reputation and that article 5(1) FC read together with 
article 8(1) FC ensured that one’s reputation can only be rightfully tarnished if the 
rules on fairness are met. Thus, a law or an action, which seeks to allow the 
negativing of reputation, can be potentially tested against principles of procedural 
fairness and substantive fairness. In this category would perhaps be the defences 
under the law of defamation, most of the criminal code and the managerial 
prerogative of taking disciplinary action against employees who have allegedly 
committed acts of misconduct. 
 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the approach taken by the High Court in 
treating the facts in Esso as falling within article 5(1) FC was correct. 
 
The case of Barat Estates Sdn Bhd & Anor v Parawakan a/l Subramaniam & Ors 
(Barat Estates)
50
 
 
In Barat Estates, the company (Barat Estates) sold its business to a third party and 
wrote to its employees informing them that the sale would not affect the continuation 
of their employment and that the new owners had agreed to continue with the services 
of the employees on the same terms and conditions of employment. The letters were 
sent on 6 November 1990. The new owners wrote to the same employees the very 
next day offering them continuation of employment on the same terms and conditions 
of employment. All the employees accepted the new owner’s offer and continued 
working. However, the employees later instituted proceedings against the new 
employer claiming a breach of section 12(3) of the Employment Act 1955 (EA)
51
 for 
failure to give appropriate notice of the termination of the contract of employment 
                                                 
48
Esso Production Malaysia Inc v Aladdin bin Mohd Hashim [2000] 3 MLJ 270 at 275 
49
Esso Production Malaysia Inc v Aladdin bin Mohd Hashim [2000] 3 MLJ 270 at 275. (Emphasis  
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50
 [2000] 4 MLJ 107  
51
 Act 265 
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upon the sale of business and sought an indemnity under section 13(1) EA for such 
failure.
52
   
 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that the employees should have been 
given the right to choose whether or not they wished to be employed by the new 
owner and that this was the purpose behind the mandatory requirement in the Act that 
the appropriate notice be given in those circumstances. In this regard, the Court of 
Appeal agreed with an earlier decision of the same court on the same issue.
53
  
 
However, in Barat Estates Gopal Sri Ram JCA introduced a constitutionally based 
reasoning and held that article 6(2) FC
54
 prohibited forced labour and that section 
12(3) EA was harmonious with article 6(2) FC in giving employees the freedom of 
choice of employment and employer. In the words of his Lordship: 
 
Of course, art 6(2) prohibits forced labour. That much is clear on a reading of 
its plain words. However, upon closer examination it does more than that. 
When the principles of construction established by our courts are applied to 
the article, it reveals a further meaning. By its spirit and intendment it vests in 
an employee the right to be employed by an employer of his choice. That is 
                                                 
52
 The relevant parts of sections 12 and 13 of the Employment Act are: 
12(1)  Either party to a contract of service may at any time give to the other party notice of his intention  
to terminate such contract of service. 
(2) The length of such notice shall be the same for both employer and employee and shall be 
determined by a provision made in writing for such notice in the terms of the contract of service, 
or, in the absence of such provision in writing, shall not be less than – 
(a) four weeks’ notice if the employee has been so employed for less than two years on the 
date on which the notice is given; 
(b) six weeks’ notice if he has been so employed for two years or more but less than five 
years on such date; 
(c) eight weeks’ notice if he has been so employed for five years or more on such date: 
Provided that this section shall not be taken to prevent either party from waiving his right to a 
notice under this subsection. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s (2), where the termination of service of the 
employee is attributable wholly or mainly to the fact that – 
… 
(f) a change has occurred in the ownership of the business for the purpose of which an 
employee is employed or of a part of such business, regardless of whether the change 
occurs by virtue of a sale or other disposition or by operation of law, 
the employee shall be entitled to, and the employer shall give to the employee, notice of 
termination of service, and the length of such notice shall be not less than that provided under 
subsub s (2) (a), (b) or (c), as the case may be, regardless of anything to the contrary contained 
in the contract of service.  
(4) Such notice shall be written and may be given at any time, and the day on which the notice is 
given shall be included in the period of the notice. 
13(1)  Either party to a contract of service may terminate such contract of service without notice or, if 
notice has already been given in accordance with s 12, without waiting for the expiry of that 
notice, by paying to the other party an indemnity of a sum equal to the amount of wages which 
would have accrued to the employee during the term of such notice or during the unexpired term 
of such notice. 
    (2)  Either party to a contract of service may terminate such contract of service without notice in the 
event of any wilful breach by the other party of a condition of the contract of service. 
53
 Radtha d/o Raju & Ors v Dunlop Estates Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 116 
54
 Article 6(2) of the Federal Constitution provides: “All forms of forced labour are prohibited, but 
Parliament may by law provide for compulsory service for national purposes”.  
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because compelling an employee to work for a particular employer, without 
affording him a choice in the matter, is merely one form of forced labour. … 
Hence, any written law or other State action or any arrangement (whether 
made pursuant to public or private law) under which an employee is deprived 
of the right of choice vested in him by art 6(2) would fall foul of the supreme 
law and be liable to be struck down or declared invalid. 
 
We emphasise the inclusion of arrangements governed by private law within 
the scope of the principle because it is not open to parties to contract out of 
the provisions of the Federal Constitution. … 
 
Put shortly, the appellants, upon sale of the business were under a statutory 
obligation to terminate the contracts of service of each of the respondents by 
giving them the appropriate notice. Since they failed to do so, they are under 
an obligation to indemnify the respondents to the extent prescribed by s13(1) 
of the Act.
55
      
 
A few observations may be made from the judgment in this case. Firstly, it seems 
quite clear that the constitutional provisions apply equally to the public law and 
private law sphere of labour law. In saying that parties may not contract out of 
constitutional provisions, the court has recognised that all employment contracts, 
public and private, are subject to the Federal Constitution. 
 
The principle of supremacy of constitutional provisions applies equally to ordinary 
legislation passed by Parliament. Therefore, labour statutes like the EA, the Trade 
Unions Act 1959
56
 and the Industrial Relations Act 1967
57
 are all subject to the 
Federal Constitution, the supreme law of the land. What necessarily follows is that 
sections 12 (3) and 13 EA must be interpreted in the light of not just article 6(2) of the 
Federal Constitution but also articles 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution. 
 
Clearly article 5(1) FC applies in these circumstances as no person ought to be 
deprived of his livelihood save in accordance with law. ‘Law’ within article 5(1) FC 
includes statute law, common law and the Federal Constitution. The relevant 
provisions in the EA seek to ensure that the appropriate notice is given upon change 
in ownership of business. The termination of the contract of employment in those 
circumstances may be viewed as a deprivation of livelihood as far as the opportunity 
to earn an income from the particular employer is concerned. This explains the 
statutory need for the appropriate notice or indemnity in lieu of notice to be given. 
 
However, case law
58
 provides that in matters of employment, the right to livelihood in 
article 5(1) FC should be read together with article 8(1) FC. Article 8(1) FC houses 
the equality doctrine and the courts have held
59
 that the equality doctrine encompasses 
                                                 
55
 Barat Estates Sdn Bhd & Anor v Parawakan a/l Subramaniam & Ors [2000] 4 MLJ 107 at p p 117 –
118. (Emphasis added). 
56
 Act 262 
57
 Act 177 
58
 Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261; Hong Leong Equipment 
Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan [1996] 1 MLJ 481 
59
 Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261; Hong Leong Equipment 
Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan [1996] 1 MLJ 481; Rama Chandran, R v The Industrial Court of Malaysia 
& Anor [1997] 1 AMR 433 
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principles of procedural and substantive fairness. There were no issues of procedure 
within this case. However, the facts do concern the principle of substantive fairness. 
 
Principles of substantive fairness within administrative law, which by analogy apply 
to labour law, include, among other categories, the failure to take into consideration 
relevant facts or taking into consideration irrelevant facts.
60
  
 
While section 12(3) EA makes the notice requirement mandatory, the question that 
needs to be asked is whether the law does in any circumstance, notwithstanding the 
notice requirement, recognise the possibility of continuation of employment with the 
new owner of business. In Barat Estates, Gopal Sri Ram JCA was of the view that ‘It 
is apparent that the section does not recognise the automatic continuation of 
employment with the new owner of the business’.61 While this may be true of the EA, 
it may not be an accurate view of the law in general.  
 
In considering whether substantive fairness has been meted out in a given case, due 
regard must be had to unjust enrichment, equitable duties and unconscionable 
bargains. Principles of equality and the rule of law would require fairness to apply not 
just to employees but also equally to employers. As such, if the evidence in Barat 
Estates revealed that the employees would have chosen to continue their employment 
with the new employers, section 13(1) EA may have been read as subject to articles 
5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution. Such a construction would prevent 
employees from taking advantage of a technical breach, which would not have caused 
any substantial injustice. Consequently, compensation for the statutory breach may be 
assessed differently.  
 
The case of Koperasi Serbaguna Sanya Bhd, Sabah v Dr James Alfred, Sabah & 
Anor (Sanya)
62
 
 
In Sanya, the Court of Appeal quashed an unfair dismissal compensation award of the 
Industrial Court on the ground that the Industrial Court had failed to take into 
consideration the fact that the employee was gainfully employed after being 
dismissed.  The case was remitted to the Industrial Court for re-assessment of 
compensation. 
 
There were two issues before the Court of Appeal. The first issue was whether the 
Industrial Court was correct in holding that the employee had been dismissed without 
just cause
63
 and the second issue was whether the Industrial Court’s compensation 
award was excessive. The court agreed with the finding of the Industrial Court that 
the employee was dismissed without just cause. However, the court held that in 
calculating the sum of back wages, the Industrial Court had not taken into 
consideration the fact that the employee had been gainfully employed within 2 months 
of his dismissal and had consequently awarded an excessive sum as compensation.  
 
                                                 
60
 Padfield v Mins for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997  
61
 Barat Estates Sdn Bhd & Anor v Parawakan a/l Subramaniam & Ors [2000] 4 MLJ 107 at 116. 
62
 [2000] 4 MLJ 87 
63
 Section 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 provides ‘Where a workman … considers that he 
has been dismissed without just cause or excuse by his employer, he may make representations in 
writing to the Director General to be reinstated in his former employment; …’   
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Gopal Sri Ram JCA relied on the highly respected academic opinion of Malhotra
64
 in 
his leading textbook on the subject where he says: 
 
In dealing with different types of cases, the tribunal in each case has to see that 
relief should be given in a particular case to a particular workman in the matter 
of compensation by balancing the conflicting claims and the variations that 
exist in human conduct and the requirements of social justice. On the parity of 
reasoning, the adjudicator has to counter-balance the claim of the employer 
that the workman was gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of 
employment with him, with the claim of the workman that he was not 
employed anywhere at all. The quantum of back-wages is, therefore, a matter 
in the discretion of the tribunal dependent on the facts of a case. The tribunal 
will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But 
the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason 
for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on 
the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the 
discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to rules of 
reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, 
vague and fanciful but legal and regular. The discretion is also to be exercised 
having regard to certain approved principles and procedures. A workman 
directed under an award to be reinstated with back-wages would not be 
entitled to back-wages for the period during which he was usefully employed 
elsewhere, because he cannot be allowed to take double advantage and make 
excessive gains relying on the wrongful act of the employers.    
 
While Malhotra is correct in requiring a fair assessment to be made taking into 
consideration relevant factors generally, the Court of Appeal could have also based 
their reasoning on the constitutional doctrine of substantive fairness found in article 
8(1) FC as principles of substantive fairness require the decision maker to take into 
account relevant considerations.
65
 
 
The case of Deputy Chief Police Officer, Perak & Anor v Ramesh a/l Thangaraju 
(Ramesh)
66
 
 
The issue in Ramesh was whether the employee, a police officer, received procedural 
fairness in relation to his dismissal. The employee was dismissed based on corruption 
charges made against him. Disciplinary proceedings were held and the employee was 
given an oral hearing and allowed to make representations. Two officers of the Anti 
Corruption Agency who had witnessed the bribery incident appeared as witnesses and 
gave oral evidence. However, the written statement of another detective was 
introduced and recorded as part of the proceedings. This detective had, since making 
the written statement, died and was therefore not present at the inquiry to give 
evidence. The employee was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses 
and the written statement. 
                                                 
64
 Malhotra, The Law of Industrial Disputes, Vol 2, 4
th
 ed at p 961 cited in Koperasi Serbaguna Sanya 
Bhd, Sabah v Dr James Alfred, Sabah & Anor [2000] 4 MLJ 87 at p 94  
65
 Padfield v Mins for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997. See the sequel to this article 
entitled ‘Charting New Horizons in Procedural Fairness and Substantive Fairness in Individual 
Employment Law in Malaysia’.  
66
 [2001] 1 MLJ 161 
 14 
 
The employee argued that the introduction of the dead witness’s written statement 
was a breach of procedural fairness. The regulations,
67
 which governed the conduct of 
disciplinary proceedings made reference to written statements made by witnesses 
giving evidence at the proceedings but was silent as to the introduction of a deceased 
witness’s written statement. The trial judge treated this omission as a prohibition of 
the admission of such evidence and therefore held that the admission of the deceased 
witness’s statement was in breach of the regulation and a breach of procedural and 
substantive fairness.
68
 
 
While the trial court
69
 was of the view that there was a breach of procedural fairness, 
the Court of Appeal held that the strict rules of evidence do not apply in domestic 
inquiries.  The rules of natural justice and procedural fairness do not prescribe a strict 
code of rules to be followed in every case. Rather, the question the review court asks 
is whether a fair hearing had been given, considering all the circumstances of the 
case.
70
 Consequently, the Court of Appeal held that the principle of procedural 
fairness had not been breached because firstly, the material witnesses who were the 
two Anti-Corruption Agency officers in the case gave their evidence in person and 
secondly, the employee was given full opportunity to cross-examine and contradict all 
evidence.
71
 
 
The Court of Appeal in its unanimous judgment in Ramesh reiterated the 
constitutional status of the doctrines of procedural and substantive fairness when 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA, in delivering the judgment of the court said: 
 
It is I think settled beyond argument that procedural and substantive fairness 
are constitutionally guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The cumulative 
operation of arts 5(1) and 8(1) of the Constitution ensure this. 
 
 Now in the early days of the development of our jurisprudence, our courts 
adopted a narrow and literal approach to the interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution, in particular those provisions which confer fundamental liberties 
upon our citizens. … 
 
We have since jettisoned the narrow approach that hitherto held the field. A 
number of our decisions have conferred a broad and liberal interpretation upon 
art[s] 5(1) and 8(1). …72 
 
                                                 
67
 Regulation 6(3) of the Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables 
Regulations) 1970  
68
 The Court of Appeal did not consider the issue of whether there was a breach of substantive fairness, 
as the applicant did not raise the issue in his pleadings. 
69
 The High Court of Malaya, where applications for judicial review are filed and heard.  
70
 In this regard, the court accepted the view of the Court of Appeal of Singapore in Abdul Raub v 
Attorney General [1983] 1 MLJ 10 at 11cited in Deputy Chief Police Officer, Perak & Anor v Ramesh 
a/l Thangaraju [2001] 1 MLJ161 at 166-167, where that Singapore court had to consider a similar issue 
arising from regulations which were in pari materia with the Malaysian regulations in question and had 
decided that “The wrongful admission of a written statement as evidence is not, in our opinion, per se 
contrary to the principles of natural justice.”  
71
 Deputy Chief Police Officer, Perak & Anor v Ramesh a/l Thangaraju [2001] 1 MLJ 161 at 167. 
72
 Deputy Chief Police Officer, Perak & Anor v Ramesh a/l Thangaraju [2001] 1 MLJ 161 at 166. 
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The Court of Appeal in Ramesh has demonstrated the pervading nature of articles 5(1) 
and 8(1) FC as having the potential to cover any fact situation arising within the 
employment relationship. Such an approach will ensure that both employees and 
employers are privy to the principles of fairness.  
 
The case of Mohd Noor bin Abdullah v Nordin bin Haji Zakaria & Anor (Mohd 
Noor)
73
 
 
In Mohd Noor, a junior police officer challenged his dismissal on the ground that he 
had not been given procedural fairness in the matter of his dismissal. He alleged that 
the show cause letter issued to him did not mention the possibility of dismissal and 
that he did not therefore appreciate the gravity of the situation.  
 
Senior and junior police officers were governed by different sets of regulations 
relating to disciplinary proceedings. The Public Officers (Conduct & Discipline) 
Regulations 1993 (the 1993 Regulations) applied to senior police officers while the 
Police (Conduct & Discipline) (Junior Police Officers & Constables) Regulations 
1970 (the 1970 Regulations) applied to junior police officers. 
 
The 1993 regulations,
74
 which applied to senior police officers, expressly provided 
that officers had to be informed of the possibility of dismissal as a punishment if such 
a possibility was contemplated by the disciplinary authority.   The 1970 Regulations 
were silent on the issue. However, the precursor to the 1993 Regulations, the Public 
Officers (Conduct & Discipline) (Chapter ‘D’) General Orders 1980 (the 1980 
Regulations), which had a similar requirement of notification, was subject to an 
addendum, Addendum A 207 (the Addendum), in the Inspector General’s Standing 
Orders. The Addendum sought to apply by extension, provisions in the 1980 
Regulations to the 1970 Regulations in cases of omission. The issue in Mohd Noor 
was whether the reference in the Addendum to the 1980 Regulations should now be 
read as referring to the 1993 Regulations. 
 
In Mohd Noor, the junior police officer argued that the beneficial provision in the 
Addendum should apply equally to the 1993 Regulations. He relied firstly, on a 
judicial precedent, Ekambaram a/l Savarimuthu v Ketua Polis Daerah Melaka 
Tengah (Ekambaram)
75
 and secondly on the constitutional requirement of procedural 
fairness in article 135(2) FC
76
 read with articles 5(1) and 8(1) FC.
77
 
 
In Ekambaram, the facts were similar to Mohd Noor and the High Court had held that 
the Addendum applied to the 1993 Regulations and that by not informing the police 
officer of the possibility of dismissal, there was a breach of the rule of natural justice, 
which required a fair hearing. 
 
In Mohd Noor, the Court of Appeal agreed with the result reached in Ekambaram but 
preferred to base their reasoning on other grounds. Gopal Sri Ram JCA, delivering the 
                                                 
73
 [2001] 2 MLJ 257 
74
 Regulation 28 
75
 [1997] 2 MLJ 454 
76
 Article 132(5) of the Federal Constitution provides that civil servants should be given a right to be 
heard before being dismissed or reduced in rank. 
77
 Which together require procedural and substantive fairness in the deprivation of livelihood. 
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unanimous judgment of the court held that firstly, section 35(2) of the Consolidated 
Interpretation Acts of 1948 & 1967
78
 would apply to produce, as a matter of deductive 
interpretation, a requirement that any reference in the Addendum to the 1980 
Regulations should be construed as referring to the 1993 Regulations.
79
   
 
The second reason relied on by the Court of Appeal was based upon the doctrine of 
procedural fairness. The court applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation as 
received in England
80
 and held that junior police officers had at all material times, a 
legitimate expectation that the relevant provisions in the 1993 Regulations would 
extend to them. His Honour said: 
 
[O]nce a particular practice has been adopted, discontinuance of it without 
prior consultation with those adversely affected by such discontinuance fatally 
flaws a determination arrived at in consequence thereof. … 
 
The English requirement of legitimate expectation is therefore one of the 
constituents of the doctrine of procedural fairness which, so far as concerns 
the members of the civil service, is to be found in the joint operation of arts 
5(1), 8(1) and 135(2) of the Federal Constitution. … It follows that a decision, 
which in England, will be quashed as offending the principle of legitimate 
expectation, will in our jurisdiction be set aside under the much broader 
doctrine of procedural fairness. I may add here that the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation has the effect of conferring both substantive rights as well. 
81
 
 
Thirdly, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the fact that the show cause letter 
did not contain the contemplated punishments was ‘in itself’ a ‘deprivation of 
procedural fairness’ because the employee would not have appreciated the gravity of 
the situation as one necessitating a satisfactory explanation.
82
 
 
The question, which arises as a result of the court’s third reason for the decision in 
Mohd Noor is whether there is now a legal requirement that all show cause letters 
should mention contemplated punishments as a matter of fair procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78
 The section provides: ‘Where any written law or any provision of a written law is repealed and re-
enacted (with or without modification), references in any other written law to the law or provision so 
repealed shall be construed as references to the re-enacted law or provision.’ 
79
 Mohd Noor bin Abdullah v Nordin bin Haji Zakaria & Anor [2001] 2 MLJ 257 at 265. 
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 The origins of the doctrine of legitimate expectation may be found in European administrative law. It 
was first received in England by Lord Denning in Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 
2 WLR 337. Later cases include Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 
AC 374, R v Bent LBC ex parte Gunning [1985] 84 LGR 168 and R v British Coal Corporation, ex 
parte Vardy [1993] ICR 720 cited in Mohd Noor bin Abdullah v Nordin bin Haji Zakaria & Anor 
[2001] 2 MLJ 257 at 264 
81
 Mohd Noor bin Abdullah v Nordin bin Haji Zakaria & Anor [2001] 2 MLJ 257 at 264. (Emphasis 
added). 
82
 Mohd Noor bin Abdullah v Nordin bin Haji Zakaria & Anor [2001] 2 MLJ 257 at 265. 
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The case of Pan Global Textiles Bhd, Pulau Pinang v Ang Beng Teik (Ang Beng 
Teik)
83
 
 
The Federal Court in Ang Beng Teik ruled firstly, that for the purposes of calculating 
time in the initiation of statutory unfair dismissal applications, time begins to run from 
the date of the termination of the contract of employment if notice of termination has 
not been given.
84
 Secondly, the Federal Court ruled that the act of being absent from 
work without permission constitutes gross misconduct, which entitles the employer to 
terminate the contract of employment. 
 
In Ang Beng Teik, the employee had stayed away from work after being demoted 
from the position of General Manager to Manager. A domestic inquiry found the 
employee to be guilty of misconduct. The company had by letter informed the 
employee about the reduction in rank and had instructed the employee to report to that 
position on a particular date. The employee however, did not respond in writing but 
chose to stay away from work. About a week later, the company again wrote to the 
employee reiterating the same. The employee responded in writing disputing the 
findings of the inquiry, stated his reasons for staying away from work and continued 
to stay away from work. 
 
The company then wrote to the employee giving him seven days to state in writing 
whether he was willing to accept the findings of the inquiry and report to work. This 
correspondence also made clear that if there were no response from the employee, the 
company would assume that the employee was no longer keen on continuing his 
employment with the company. The employee did not respond to the final letter and 
the company wrote to the employee terminating his services with the company on the 
ground that the employee was not interested in continuing in his employment. The 
employee initiated statutory unfair dismissal proceedings and the Minister referred his 
representations to the Industrial Court for arbitration. 
 
The Industrial Court held that the employee had been unfairly dismissed. However, 
the High Court, on judicial review proceedings quashed the decision of the Industrial 
Court and held that the application was statute-barred as the dismissal took place 
when the employee made the decision to stay away from work and had thus dismissed 
himself.
85
 The employee then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the 
decision of the Industrial Court. 
 
The preliminary issue before the courts was whether the employee’s unfair dismissal 
application was statute-barred. Section 20(1A) IRA imposed a mandatory requirement 
that the application be filed within sixty days of the employee being dismissed. The 
cardinal question was whether, on the facts, the dismissal occurred on the date of the 
termination of the contract of employment by the employer or by the repudiation of 
the contract by the employee, in abandoning his employment. 
                                                 
83
 [2002] 2 MLJ 27 
84
 If notice of termination has been given, section 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 provides 
that the employee may file his representation of unfair dismissal at any time during the period of notice 
but not later than sixty days from the expiry of such notice. 
85
 The High Court had relied on Lord Denning’s doctrine of self-dismissal in London Transport 
Executive v Clarke [1981] ICR 355 at 365 cited in Pan Global Textiles Bhd, Pulau Pinang v Ang Beng 
Teik [2002] 2 MLJ 27 at 33-35 
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The Federal Court held that dismissal took place when the employer terminated the 
contract of employment by accepting the employee’s misconduct of failing to report 
for work as directed.
86
 Thus, time began to run from that date and consequently, the 
employee was within the statutory time-frame in lodging his application for unfair 
dismissal.
87
  
 
The High Court had held that the employee had repudiated the contract by 
unreasonably absenting himself from work without permission.
88
 It therefore follows 
that the High Court considered the employee to be in breach of his common law 
implied duty to work. However, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the 
employee’s absence from work was a rightful extension of his dispute over the 
findings of the domestic inquiry.  
 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal had said that the 
common law principles on the discharge of a contract of service by repudiation on the 
part of the employee and acceptance of that repudiation by the employer, relied on by 
the High Court were “wholly irrelevant” to the construction of section 20 IRA 
because industrial adjudication under the IRA was concerned with equity, good 
conscience and the substantial merits of the case instead of legal technicalities. His 
Lordship had relied on the Supreme Court decision of Wong Chee Hong v Cathay 
Organization (M) Sdn Bhd wherein the court had held that the English doctrine of 
unreasonableness for constructive dismissal only applied within the different English 
statutory scheme and could not apply under the Malaysian statutory scheme for unfair 
dismissal which operated under the traditional law of contract principles at common 
law.
89
  
 
There appears to be a contradiction in judicial reasoning here. On the one hand, Gopal 
Sri Ram JCA said that traditional contract law principles applied under English law 
and not the Malaysian legislation while on the other hand his Lordship refers to and 
attempts to apply the dicta of Salleh Abbas LP in Wong Chee Hong where his 
Lordship had held that traditional contract law theory at common law does apply 
under the Malaysian statutory scheme. 
 
The basis of the Court of Appeal’s decision was that the employer had dismissed the 
employee by terminating the contract of employment and that such dismissal was 
without just cause as the employee was merely engaged in an ongoing dispute over 
the correctness of the domestic inquiry. In refusing to treat the actions of the 
employee as amounting to a fundamental breach evincing an intention to repudiate the 
contract, Gopal Sri Ram JCA justified his movement away from traditional contract 
law principles by relying on Hong Leong wherein the court opined that the IRA was a 
piece of social legislation designed to mitigate the harshness of common law and 
                                                 
86
 The Federal Court explained that the doctrine of repudiation for fundamental breach of contract 
could not apply here as the evidence showed that the employee had the intention of solving the dispute 
and continuing with the employment contract. Pan Global Textiles Bhd, Pulau Pinang v Ang Beng Teik 
[2002] 2 MLJ 27 at 37 
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 Pan Global Textiles Bhd, Pulau Pinang v Ang Beng Teik [2002] 2 MLJ 27 at 40 
88
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89
 Pan Global Textiles Bhd, Pulau Pinang v Ang Beng Teik [2002] 2 MLJ 27 at 35 
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equity in the sphere of labour relations and thus should not be interpreted in 
accordance with the common law.
90
    
 
However, the question, which arises from the approach of the Court of Appeal, is 
whether this scheme of ‘social consciousness’ created by beneficial social legislation 
like the IRA does also recognise certain duties and not merely confer rights upon 
employees? In this context, it is indeed ironical that the very judge who recognised 
labour rights as constitutional rights has not also embraced the concept of 
corresponding duties. Procedural and substantive fairness must involve a fair and just 
distribution of rights and duties. Further, the existing common law rights and duties 
arising under the contract of employment can be elevated to a constitutional footing 
within the right to livelihood and doctrines of procedural and substantive fairness.
91
 A 
Hofeldian analysis of rights and duties as jural correlatives will produce such an 
outcome.
92
 Examples would include the right to income vis-à-vis the duty to work and 
the right to suspend an employee for the purposes of investigating a misconduct vis-à-
vis the duty to compensate the employee for the period of suspension.  
 
The Federal Court however, recognised the common law duty upon the employee to 
attend work and had ruled that the Industrial Court had committed an error of law in 
not giving effect to such a duty. Although the Federal Court did not use the 
terminology ‘duty’, by saying that the employee did not have a ‘right’ of absence 
from work,
93
 the Federal Court has indirectly said that the employee has a duty to 
work when lawfully required to by the employer.
94
   
 
However, in the light of the recent constitutional pronouncements within labour law, 
it is indeed unfortunate that the Federal Court did not couch their reasoning within the 
constitutional doctrines of right to livelihood, procedural fairness and substantive 
fairness in articles 5(1) and 8(1) FC. Procedural fairness would have been observed by 
the employer through the letters written to the employee requiring him to report for 
work. The responsible option, from the perspective of corresponding rights and duties 
for the employee would have been to attend work but challenge the legality of the 
earlier domestic inquiry in a separate action.  
 
An interesting question, from the constitutional status versus contract perspective, is 
whether the respective courts in Ang Beng Teik had used a contract or status approach 
to the employment dispute before them. The reasoning of the High Court shows that 
the High Court had used a strict contractual approach in treating the fundamental 
breach as a repudiatory breach, while the reasoning of the Federal Court reveals a 
modified contractual approach as the court recognised the intention of the employee 
in wanting to resolve the dispute and continue working within the enterprise, but 
treated the failure to report to work as a gross misconduct entitling the employer to 
accept the misconduct and dismiss the employee. The Federal Court did not use the 
                                                 
90
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traditional contractual reasoning or terminology of fundamental or repudiatory breach. 
This supports the argument that traditional contract law theory is ill suited to the 
analysis and solution of employment disputes. Rather, the emerging constitutional 
norms provide a better methodology. 
 
The case of Rajasingam a/l VS Rasiah v Government of Malaysia (Rajasingam)
95
 
 
In Rajasingam, an Immigration Officer in the Department of Immigration was 
required by letter from his employer, the Government of Malaysia to retire from 
public service on grounds of public interest.
96
 The letter stated that the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong
97
 had exercised his discretion under section 10(5) d of the Pensions 
Act 1980
98
 in requiring such retirement and by virtue of section 3(2) of the Pensions 
Act 1980,
99
 had also imposed a 30% reduction on his pension. The public servant 
commenced judicial review proceedings and sought a declaration in the High Court 
that the decision by the Government of Malaysia was a nullity as it was harsh, unjust 
and in breach of procedural fairness as he was not given a fair hearing. The applicant 
relied on the constitutional principles in Tan’s Case,100 Hong Leong101 and Rama 
Chandran
102
 to support his argument.  
 
However, the High Court ruled that since the proviso in article 135(2) of the Federal 
Constitution
103
 expressly provided that public service terminations were not 
dismissals, the applicant was not entitled to the fair hearing requirement within article 
135(2) FC. Jeffrey Tan J went on to hold that the case of Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah 
Am Penjara & Ors 
104
 would apply in preference to Tan’s Case on the issue of 
punishment as the Federal Court in Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors
105
 
had held that in the sphere of public service employment, the civil courts could not 
interfere with punishments decided by the disciplinary board. 
 
                                                 
95
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A few important comments may be made on Rajasingam. Firstly, the High Court 
treated the issue of termination of employment by way of compulsory retirement in 
the same vein as public service ‘punishments’ and thus applied Ng Hock Cheng v 
Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors
106
 when there is actually no issue of ‘punishment’ in 
compulsory retirements arising out of public interest.  By doing so, the High Court 
decided that articles 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution
107
 did not apply to the 
case before them.
108
 It is submitted that this approach was incorrect. 
 
The second comment is that while the second proviso in article 135(2) of the Federal 
Constitution provides terminations of service in the public interest are not to be 
construed as dismissals, the same proviso does not expressly provide that there shall 
be no hearing in all such cases. It is important to note that while the first proviso in 
article 135(2) expressly provides that the right to be heard does not apply to the four 
categories stipulated therein,
109
 the second proviso does not contain the same express 
negation of the right to be heard in terminations of service in the public interest. All 
the second proviso does is to provide that terminations in the public interest do not 
amount to dismissals. Therefore, the requirement of hearing for dismissals and 
reductions in rank provided for under article 135(2)FC would not apply to public 
interest terminations. As such, there is no express constitutional provision providing 
for the right procedure in public interest terminations. 
 
However, even if the said proviso was to be interpreted to mean that there shall be no 
hearing in public interest terminations of service, it does not automatically follow that 
there should be no right to procedural fairness. Procedural fairness encompasses a 
much broader spectrum than the right to be heard. At the very least, procedural 
fairness includes the duty to act fairly.
110
 
 
The High Court could have considered whether there was a general duty to act fairly 
when an individual’s livelihood was adversely affected. The Court of Appeal in Hong 
Leong had opined that procedural fairness extends to all state action and had also, in 
the same judgment recognised that there may be cases where it may not be 
appropriate to grant procedural fairness.
111
 Although the Court of Appeal in that case 
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did not provide an exhaustive list of possible situations where there may be a lawful 
negation of procedural fairness in the deprivation of livelihood, analogous 
circumstances may be drawn from the law concerning the exceptions to procedural 
fairness in administrative law.
112
 This connects to the third comment regarding 
Rajasingam. 
 
The High Court in Rajasingam could have considered whether the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong’s discretionary powers under the Pensions Act 1980 were reviewable in 
judicial review proceedings or whether they were in a class of unreviewable 
discretions. If the High Court was of the opinion that the class of powers under 
consideration were reviewable discretions, then the High Court could have gone on to 
consider if there was a duty on the part of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to provide 
reasons for the decision. The High Court could have then assessed if the reasons 
amounted to relevant considerations. In failing to do so, there remains an uncertainty 
in relation to the width and breadth of procedural and substantive fairness in public 
employment.     
 
Further, it is unclear whether Jeffrey Tan J appreciated that the dicta of the Federal 
Court in Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors
113
concerning the substitution 
of punishment orders was confined to the public service as his Honour had, upon 
referring to the relevant dicta of the Federal Court said: 
 
It could not be any more explicit that the court cannot interfere with the 
punishment, in that the court (whether it be the High Court, Court of Appeal or 
the Industrial Court) cannot substitute its own views as to what the 
appropriate penalty was for the view of the particular employer concerned.
114
  
  
It is submitted that in referring to the ‘Industrial Court’ and ‘particular employer’, 
Jeffrey Tan J has not correctly applied the ratio decidendi of the Federal Court in Ng 
Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors,
115
 which clearly restricts the 
pronouncement in Ng to public service discipline. 
 
The case of Abdul Majid bin Hj Nazardin & Ors v Paari Perumal (Abdul Majid)
116
 
 
Abdul Majid concerned the position of a probationary employee in private sector 
employment. The employee had continued to work after the probationary period was 
over but did not receive confirmation of permanent employment status. Although the 
employee had requested that he be given written confirmation of his employment 
status and that his salary be adjusted to reflect the change in employment status, the 
employers did not confirm his employment but continued paying him his probationary 
salary for nine months after the expiry of the three-month probationary period. 
However, the probationer was allowed to take annual leave on six occasions although 
contractually, only confirmed employees were entitled to annual leave.  
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The employee resigned and sued the employer for breach of contract claiming his 
entitlement to the increments he should have received as a confirmed employee. The 
Magistrate Court dismissed the suit but the High Court reversed the magistrate’s 
decision and held that the employer had breached the contract of employment by not 
paying the employee his entitled confirmation increment upon expiry of the 
probationary period. The High Court inferred that the conduct of the employer in 
allowing the employee to take his annual leave meant that the employer had treated 
the employee as a confirmed employee. The High Court went on to award the 
employee compensation in the form of thirteen months back wages and the increment 
due to him.  
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court on appeal by the employer 
but restricted the quantum of damages to the increment due to the employee during 
his period of employment. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the employee should 
not be compensated for the thirteen-month period of non-employment because this 
would amount to punitive damages against the employer, considering that the 
employee had only been in their employment for a post-confirmation period of nine 
months. However, the Court of Appeal awarded an additional three months salary in 
compensation as payment in lieu of notice of termination. The court’s reasoning was 
that the employer could have given the employee notice to leave and that since the 
contract did not contain any express stipulation as to the period of such notice, the 
court could imply a reasonable period of three months. It is submitted that the Court 
of Appeal’s justification for the compensation in lieu of notice is flawed and arbitrary 
as there was nothing within the facts to suggest that the employer was considering 
termination.   
 
The fact that the probationer in Abdul Majid had to rely on a contractual cause of 
action reveals the precarious position of probationers. In these circumstances, the 
‘probationer’, who for all intents and purposes was in fact treated as a confirmed 
employee, should have been able to consider himself constructively dismissed as a 
result of fundamental breach on the part of the employer.  
 
From the perspective of labour law theory, the Court of Appeal could have reviewed 
the law on probationary contracts
117
 and considered whether articles 5(1) and 8(1) FC 
also applied to probationers. There is no logical reason why the constitutional 
protection of livelihood should not also apply to probationary employees. If such an 
extension were made, then employers would have to observe principles of procedural 
and substantive fairness when dealing with probationers, as all contracts of 
employment would be subject to the relevant constitutional norms. The standards of 
fairness however, may differ as between confirmed and probationary employees as 
would expectations.
118
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Conclusion 
 
The judicial reasoning in the cases above reveals an emerging labour law theory with 
constitutional principles at its foundations. Although the Malaysian courts have not 
developed these doctrines fully and have not applied them consistently, it is apparent 
from the cases discussed above that the constitutional pronouncements in Tan’s 
case
119
 have had a considerable impact on Malaysian labour jurisprudence.  
 
As the courts continue to grapple with these new directions, it appears that the stage is 
being set for a movement away from contract to constitutional status in labour law 
theory.
120
 I will in a sequel to this article,
121
 chart possible avenues for case law 
reform by utilising the emerging theories of a constitutionalised labour jurisprudence. 
This evaluation will prove that it is possible to construct a judicially developed 
framework of constitutional rules and principles, which will provide the foundation 
for a new labour law, one that is founded on an amalgamation of the law of contract, 
constitutional law and administrative law.   
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